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The goal of the paper is to analyze how financial and economic crises affect the relation between capital 
flows and their determinants.  We develop a model of foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and apply it to Turkey using an endogenous break analysis and accounting for country 
risk. We identify two breakpoints that correspond to two crises dates.  Our results show changes in the sign 
and/or coefficient of a number of determinants in both types of investment and thus suggest that analyses 
based on the assumption of parameter constancy may lead to misleading results.    
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 Introduction 
The end of the last century saw a shift in developing and emerging countries’ priorities towards 
attracting international capital flows, perceived to be complementary to the development 
process of the economies.  As a result of this change, capital flows to these countries grew 
about 10 folds during the 1990s (World Economic Outlook).  However, the distribution of the 
components of flows between foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign portfolio investment 
(FPI), has been uneven.  Many low-income countries have been unsuccessful in attracting FDI, 
but received a fair amount of short-term portfolio investment.   
Most analysts now agree that FPI is often prone to sudden stops and, even worse, 
reversals, leading to financial crises such as in Mexico, Brazil, Russia, Asian countries, 
Turkey, Argentina, Uruguay  (Calvo, 1998, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, IMF, 1995, Claasens et 
al., 1995).  In contrast, FDI is widely regarded as a stable development engine, crucial for a 
quick and fundamental take–off for industrialization.
1   
In this study, we examine the factors affecting inflows of different types of capital.  In 
particular, we analyze how financial and economic crises create structural changes that affect 
the relation between capital flows and their determinants, and apply the analysis to Turkey.  In 
doing this, we assume that the number of breaks and the number of parameters affected by 
structural changes are unkown.   
Despite a large volume of literature on capital flows, studies emphasizing the 
breakdown of the types of capital flows are relatively recent and mostly involve panel data.  
Although this approach provides valuable information about the broad determinants of flows, it 
is does not allow identification of individual countries’ idiosyncratic features.  In particular, 
structural breaks due to domestic and international crises, which affect the sentiment of 
domestic and international investors, can change the relation between the fundamentals and the 
flows of capital.  Such concerns are best addressed at the individual country level.  
Turkey is a typical example of an emerging economy that followed successive 
liberalization policies but has not been able to substitute FDI for short-term borrowing to 
finance the economy.  Weaknesses in the banking system together with high growth rates over 
the last two decades made the economy more dependent on foreign private capital, which 
consist mostly of FPI.  Turkey exhibits most of the symptoms of a developing country 
                                                 
1 See Lim (2001) for a survey of the literature on the relation between FDI and growth.  
  1grappling with the problem of not being able to borrow in its own currency, referred to as the 
original sin (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1997).  This problem, in turn, leads to currency and 
maturity mismatch and creates a volatile and unstable environment prone to crises.  For these 
reasons, flows are highly volatile in nature and remain low relative to East European and Latin 
American countries (Table 1).   
In this paper, we develop a model to analyze capital flows, and examine it empirically.  
We decompose the flows and examine how the components are affected not only by 
fundamentals but also by country-specific risk reflecting political, financial and economic 
uncertainty, and crises faced by the country.  In particular, we examine whether there is an 
asymmetric effect on FDI and FPI of crises and country risk as perceived by foreign investors 
in Turkey.  With the largest 4th economy among the emerging markets (after Mexico, 
Argentina and Russia) listed by World Bank in the European, Central Asian and Latin 
American-Caribbean regions, the Turkish experience can provide insight into the FDI versus 
FPI debate, which would further our understanding of capital flows and crises in emerging 
markets.   
Most of the literature on capital flows does not distinguish between different 
components of the flows, and to our knowledge, there is no attempt at examining the effect of 
structural changes on flows.  This approach is particularly important for emerging markets 
because (i) they are constantly exposed to domestic and international crises and (ii) they often 
implement policies that lead to major structural changes in the economy.  Further, it is 
important to determine the structural breaks endogenously.  Choosing the break dates 
exogenously introduces arbitrariness in the analysis.  Even if information on the timing of the 
structural changes were available, it is very hard to determine the exact timing of their effect on 
the variables.   
Studies on capital flows specifically to Turkey are surprisingly scant, even though the 
subject is important for the development process of the country in particular, and other 
developing economies, in general.  Thus, our analysis contributes to the literature on capital 
flows by showing how to approach multiple shifts caused by crises in a model of capital flows.  
We examine and compare the effects on portfolio flows with those on FDI flows.  Our analysis 
thus offers an original approach to examining the case of a liberalized emerging economy that 
has not been successful in attracting foreign capital. 
  2Our findings indicate that (i) the models perform poorly if they do not take account of 
breaks caused by crises; (ii) institutional factors, structural reforms and crises affect both 
components asymmetrically.  FPI is vulnerable to regional contagion (Russian crisis) and 
responds negatively to financial risk, while FDI is sensitive to economic risk but is not affected 
by contagion.  Both flows were hurt by the domestic banking crisis; crises introduce instability 
in the parameters of two of the determinants of FPI, while they create instability in the 
parameters of all determinants of FDI, except one.     
The paper is organized as follows.  After a brief summary of the literature on capital 
flows in Section 1, we overview the stylized facts depicting the Turkish economy since the 
1980s.  We develop an optimizing model to get reduced form equations for both types of 
investment in Section 3.  In Section 4, we describe the methodology and the data, followed by 
the empirical results.  We conclude in the last section. 
 
I. Literature survey and economic background 
Although capital flows in general and their individual components have been the subject of 
extensive research and policy discussions, just a handful of studies emphasized the different 
characteristics of types of financial flows (e.g., Sarno and Taylor, 1997, Bosworth and Collins, 
1999, Reinhard and Talvi, 1998, Chuhan, Claessens an Mamingi, 1998, Ito, 1999, Wilkins, 
1999).  These studies, like the earlier literature analyzing aggregate or net flows, examined if 
pull (domestic) factors or push (external) factors affect the individual components of financial 
flows.  Most results support both factors to varying degrees.   
More recently, researches turned their attention to political economy variables that are 
likely to affect the flows, in particular FDI.  Results show that a worsening of political and 
economic risk ratings (Lehmann, 1999) or corruption (Wei and Wu, 1990) reduce FDI relative 
to foreign loans, thereby increasing the risk of crisis.  Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych 
(2003, 2004) find that institutional quality as well as sound domestic policies are important 
determinants of different types of capital flows. 
   Most of the literature on the Turkish economy since the 1980s revolves around 
liberalization.  Besides economic liberalization, studies examined the impact of 
financial/capital account liberalization on factors as varied as investment (Guncavdi, Bleaney 
and McKay, 1998, Uctum, 1992), fiscal policy (Agenor, McDermott and Ucer, 1997 ), 
  3exchange rate policy (Asikoglu and Uctum, 1992), currency substitution (Akcay, Alper, 
Karasulu, 1997).  Few studies analyzed the role of FDI and liberalization (Balasubramanyam, 
1996, Balkir 1993, Fry, 1993).  Even a smaller number of studies examined the effect of FDI or 
capital flows on the Turkish economy.  The main results are that although during the 1980s 
foreign capital helped economic growth (Rodrik, 1990), in the 1990s it contributed to financial 
fragility because it was channeled into financing private and public consumption instead of 
productive activity (Ulengin and Yenturk , 2001, Yenturk 1999). 
Since the 1980s, The Turkish economy went through several structural changes and 
was affected by the socio-political conditions in the country.  Government policies replaced the 
inward-oriented import substitution by the export-oriented development process and gradually 
liberalized the financial markets and the capital account.  The positive effect of these reforms 
reflected in the increase of the FDI inflows to the country in the second half of the 1980s 
(Figure 1 top panel).  However, despite this rise, the level of the flows remained low compared 
to other countries with a similar background. 
  During the 1990s and the early 2000s the Turkish economy weathered several crises.  
Delays in implementation of structural reforms the economy needed in the banking industry 
and in public finances played the role of catalyst for the crises.  Successive governments failed 
to tackle the chronic high inflation, high public deficit that plagued the economy despite the 
liberalization efforts.  At the beginning of the 1990s, inflow of capital, high inflation and a 
pegged exchange rate regime led to substantial loss in competitiveness.  High interest spread 
caused by government’s financing needs and low exchange rate risk led domestic banks to 
borrow from abroad and lend to the government.  With a currency regime following a 
crawling-peg, banks’ demand for foreign reserves soared.  The resulting decline in central bank 
reserves induced a full-fledged attack on Turkish lira in the first quarter of 1994.  This crisis 
was short lived and resulted in a relatively mild reversal in the flows (Figure 1).   Both FDI and 
FPI continued in a relatively stable fashion until the end of the decade.   
In 1998-2001, however, successive crises led to major reversals in both components of 
capital flows.  Despite surviving the Asian crisis in 1997 unscathed, Turkey was badly hit by 
the emerging market crisis following the Russian default in 1998.  While massive flight of 
short-term capital put a squeeze on domestic financial markets, the export markets collapsed 
and hurt the economic activity.   
  4The twin crises of 2000-01, in turn, are caused by internal factors and bear some 
resemblance to the 1994 crisis.  As a result of wrong policy incentives and a deficient corporate 
governance system, banks continued to borrow short from abroad in foreign currency and 
invest in high yielding government bonds with relatively longer maturities.  By 2000, the 
banking system had increased its exchange rate exposure dangerously and faced significant 
maturity mismatch and liquidity risk. Delays in banking sector reforms, lax fiscal policy and a 
currency appreciating in real terms severely weakened the banking system, created an 
unsustainable current account deficit and, eventually, caused an outflow of portfolio 
investment depreciating the Turkish lira.  Capital outflows contributed to further depreciation 
of the currency and anxiety in the markets, which triggered a banking crisis at the end of 2000.  
The real interest rates shot up following the liquidity squeeze, and the Turkish lira was floated 
in January 2001.  Against the background of distress in the financial markets, a political spat 
between politicians in the first quarter of 2001 triggered a run on the currency, which lost its 
value by 36 percent, and a financial crisis.      
Can the traditional financial and macroeconomic factors explain fluctuations in FDI and 
FPI?  As a preamble to the model we develop below, we plot four macroeconomic variables 
representing mainly pull factors (we introduce the push factors in the empirical section): real 
interest rate, real price of capital, tax rate, unit labor cost, and real exchange rate.  In addition, 
we also consider three risk measures (political, financial and economic) developed by the 
International Country Risk Group (ICRG), which we use as a proxy to assess the risk 
perception of the market participants.  Although it is unlikely that eyeballing the data will 
provide a clear relation between the capital flow variables and the independent variables, it is 
informative to give a sense of the direction the economy took for the last two decades.     
 
II. Overview of the data   
Figure 2 relates the capital flows, the macroeconomic and risk variables.  Everything else being 
constant, we expect a negative relation between the real interest rate and portfolio flows.  This 
negative correlation becomes noticeable in the second half of the sample.  The Treasury-bill 
rate, adjusted for inflation, was relatively stable until 1990, with a positive trend in 1990-94.  It 
skyrocketed in 1994 as a result of Central Bank’s effort to fight capital outflows reacting to the 
crisis.  During the second half of the 1990s, the real rate fluctuated around a higher mean, and 
  5declined precipitously at the end of the decade as a result of a decline in the risk premium. 
After 2000, the real rates climbed up, reflecting tight credit conditions in the domestic markets 
and a scarcity of foreign capital ensuing the twin crises, and then declined as confidence was 
restored and capital flows resumed.  The negative relation is broadly consistent with the 
subperiod averages of 0.29,  -0.03 for portfolio investment, and 0.57, 0.54 for real interest rates 
during 1984.1-1998.1 and 1998.2-2004.1, respectively. 
  The real capital price is a factor price that is expected to affect FDI negatively.  It 
exhibits a positive trend until the end of the 1990s, and a negative trend, thereafter.  An 
examination of the period averages reveals that the trends confirm this negative relation.  
Before and after the Russian crisis, the sample averages are 77.8, 64.4 for real capital price, 
and 0.12, 0.20 for FDI. 
  The exchange rate can affect capital flows through various channels, and the effect is 
ambiguous a priori.  Several studies find a positive relation between the value of a currency 
and capital inflows (Froot and Stein, 1991, Klein and Rosengren, 1994).  The argument for a 
positive relation goes as follows.  A depreciation of host country’s currency reduces costs in 
host country for the foreign investor, and stimulates foreign direct investment (Cushman, 1985, 
Barrel and Pain, 1999, Blonigen, 1997).  Another justification comes from wealth effect.  In an 
environment with incomplete markets, a systematic depreciation of a currency lowers domestic 
residents wealth and lead foreign acquisition of domestic assets (Froot and Stein, 1991).   
However, other studies find no significant effect (Goldberg and Klein, 1998, Carlson 
and Hernandez, 2002).  This result can be justified on the grounds that what matters for an 
international investor is not the price of foreign assets, and therefore the current level of the 
exchange rate, but the rate of return of these assets.  In our model we show that a second 
channel of ambiguity arises due to valuation effect versus cost effect. 
Throughout the 1980s Turkey has been following a crawling peg.  The effective real 
exchange rate appreciated until the 1990s due to high inflation rate.  Since then, the authorities 
managed to stabilize it by matching the crawl rate with the inflation rate.  The two exceptions 
are the two crises (1994 and 2000-01) where the currency devalued substantially after the 
speculative attacks.  If we look at the subsamples 1991-1998 and 1998-2003, which excludes 
the initial drastic appreciation, the period averages for real exchange rate and FDI are 500, 532 
  6and 0.12, 0.20, respectively.  This is broadly consistent with the view that the exchange rate 
and FDI are positively correlated. 
  The tax rate on financial transactions and labor cost are two factors that are likely to 
affect the FDI but also the FPI via the production channel.  Both factors affect the profits of 
companies investing in the host country but also domestic companies that borrow from abroad.  
Thus, an increase in both the unit labor cost (ulc) and the tax rate puts a downward pressure on 
capital inflows.  After the coup d’etat of the 1980-83, restrictions on political and union 
activites continued until the second half of the 1980s.  This decreased real wages and the ulc 
until 1988.  In 1988-92, the competition between political parties and removal of restrictions 
on political activities set off populist policies, which allowed more than 100 percent increases 
in real wages.  This increase, however, did not affect the inflows of capital, presumably 
because even with higher wages, labor still remains a relatively cheap factor in Turkey.  During 
the following decade, the ulc does not exhibit any trend.  The tax rate, computed as corporate 
tax over GDP, is expressed as a differential (relative to the corporate tax rate in foreign 
countries). It declines until 1990 but expands in the first half of the 1990s before decreasing 
again in mid 1990s.  It has been on a new rising trend since the mid 1990s.   
  The bottom panel displays the three country-risk measures.  An increase (decrease) in 
each measure depicts a worsening (improvement) of risk, meaning the country becomes less 
(more) risky for the international investor.
2  The risk profile of the country deteriorated until 
the end of the 1980s as a result of political tensions and the inability of the government to 
control high inflation.  With the liberalization efforts that took place throughout the 1980s, and 
the removal of political uncertainty after the general elections in 1991, all risk categories show 
a marked improvement in the early 1990s.   
The situation, however, worsened again at the onset of the 1994 crisis.  The political unrest in 
the country together with weak governments worsened the political risk until a new coalition 
government came to power at the end of the 1990s.  The financial risk took a turn for the worse 
when Standard and Poor downgraded Turkey’s foreign debt from B+ to B and stock prices 
tumbled down.  It deteriorated further from fear of contagion during the Russian crisis in 1998.   
                                                 
2 The ICRG risk measure shows the decrease in risk, or improvement in the riskiness of the country.  To 
make the series compatible with country risk, we redefine the series as  i risk − 1 , with i=financial, 
economic, political risk. 
  7A disinflationary program initiated by the government in 1998 and then again in 1999, 
backed by the IMF with a substantial credit line in a stand-by agreement, improved both the 
economic and financial risk.  All risk measures show an immediate but brief deterioration 
following the twin-crises in 2000-01.   The recovery is partly due to vigorous structural 
reforms implemented by the government, tightening of monetary and fiscal policies, floating of 
the Turkish lira and a new IMF support package.  Next, we develop an optimizing model to 




We assume that the host country is a small open economy where two distinct monopolistic 
firms operate using a domestic factor of production, L, and a factor that requires foreign 
capital, with production functions exhibiting diminishing marginal product and constant returns 
to scale.  The representative domestic firm produces according to the production function: 
(1)    ) , (
d d d L B Q Q =
where B are inputs financed by means of foreign borrowing, and L
d is the local factor of 
production.  The foreign firm that is operating in the domestic market is producing both in the 
host country and in its country of origin.  In the host country, it uses the local factor of 
production L
f, and brings in foreign capital F, as foreign direct investment (FDI).  Its 
production function in the host country is: 
(2)    ) , (
f f f L F Q Q =
 
(i) Optimization of the domestic firm.  
In this section we derive the demand for inputs by means of foreign borrowing and its 
determinants (B).  The domestic firm maximizes its profit denominated in domestic currency:  
(3)    ) , ( ) ( ) 1 (
d d d d d d Q TC X X P t θ Π − − =
subject to the constraint that sales are equal to production, and where X
d is the domestic sales 
and it is function of the domestic price index P and income Y, 
d P is the price of the firm’s 
product in the domestic economy, t is the corporate tax rate on domestic firms, TC is the total 
  8cost of production faced by the domestic firm, and θ  is a vector of production costs including 
labor (W ), and cost of borrowing  (
* R ).   
We get from the first-order conditions: 
(4)  ) Q , ( MC
) t (






















 being based on the price elasticity of the domestic firm in the 
domestic market.  The markup changes with the value of the elasticity, which in turn varies 
with the product price and income.   
A constant-elasticity demand curve implies a zero price-elasticity of markups 
( ).  This is a constant markup.  Any convex or linear demand curve yields a negative 
relation between prices and markups (
0 = p M
0 < p M ), which is a variable markup.   The sign of 
depends on the sign of  y M y ε .  Homothetic preferences or a linear demand curve imply a zero 
or a positive elasticity of markups, respectively.   Thus, the sign of the income elasticity of the 
markup can be positive, negative or zero.  Quasi-concave production function implies that, for 
given factor cost, the sign of  .   0 ≥ Q MC
  Totally differentiating the FOC in equation (4) and assuming for simplicity that the 
firm’s price is equal to domestic price, we get: 
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2 1 1 1 1 1
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From the cost minimization problem, using the envelope theorem, marginal cost is equal to the 
Lagrange multiplier λ, so  Q W L MC W = = ∂ ∂ / λ , and  Q R B MC R / * = = ∂ ∂λ .   
  9From the envelope theorem we also get the factor demand functions (Shephard’s 
lemma).  Among these demand functions, we are particularly interested in B, the demand for 
foreign funds: 
R





) , , ( , and hence: 
(6)    ) Q , R , W ( B B
f =
The sufficient second-order conditions for cost minimization give the direct effects of 
production cost on B as  and  0 > w B 0 < * R B  but an ambiguous output effect,   >0 or <0.   
However, adopting the reasonable assumption that B and L are normal, we can expect   
and  .  This result also holds using the second-order conditions for constrained 
minimization and the assumption that the production function is homogeneous of degree 1.  
Thus,   and  by the normality assumption of factors of production.   
Q B
0 > Q B
0 > Q L
0 < W Q 0 < R Q
Replacing (5) into (6),  .    )) t , R , W , Y , P ( Q , R , W ( B B
/ /
f
− − − − + + − +
=
0
Now  .  The first term is the direct effect and the second term is the 
indirect effect, through output.  Normalizing with P, we get the reduced form of demand for 
foreign funds: 
θ θ θ Q B B B Q + =
(7)    ) t , Y , r , w ( B B
/
f
/ − − + − − +
=
where the first two terms represent the real cost of labor, and of borrowing.  This equation says 
that if labor is expensive, then firms substitute for an input financed by foreign borrowing 
(direct cost effect).   An increase in the labor cost also decreases output and hence reduces the 
demand for all factors of production (indirect output effect).  Thus the net effect of a rise in 
wages is ambiguous.   
A rise in the cost of borrowing has an unambiguous effect.  The direct cost effect and 
the output effect both reduce the demand for foreign funds.  The income effect comes in 
through the demand side of the firm’s profit maximization and the sign is unknown since it 
depends on the income elasticity of the markup. A rise in taxes reduces production and 
therefore the demand for foreign funds. 
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The foreign firm is a discriminating monopolist that produces at home (in the country of 
origin) and in the host country.  It maximizes its nominal profits denominated in its own 
currency: 
(8)    ) Q , Q , ( TC ) X ( P ) ( X ) X ( SP ) (
h f f h h h f f f f φ τ τ Π − − + − = 1 1
where S is the nominal exchange rate and is defined as the investor’s home currency units in 
terms of the host currency units, 
f P and 
h P are the price of the product the foreign firm sells at 
host country and the country of origin, respectively; τ  and   are the tax rates on the 
subsidiary’s profits and the tax paid in the country of origin. 
h τ
f X , 
h X  are total sales of foreign 
firm’s product in the host country and the country of origin, and they are function of price and 
income in each country.  TC
f is the total cost faced by the foreign firm for its production 
activity both at home and abroad, and φ  is a vector of costs of production both in the host 
country and the country of origin, including labor ( ), and cost of capital  ( ).   
h W , W
h ,ρ ρ
From the first-order maximization conditions, the marginal revenue of the foreign firm 
is equal to its marginal cost of production (MR
f=MC
f ) and: 
(9)  ) Q , Q , ( MC
) (


























 being based on the price elasticity of the foreign firm in the 
domestic market.  The markup changes with the value of the elasticity, which in turn varies 
with the product price and income.  As for the domestic firm, a constant markup occurs when 
the markup has zero price-elasticity  0 = p N , and a variable markup is when  .  The sign 
of  , the income elasticity of the markup can be positive, negative or zero, depending on the 
sign of  .   We assume that the foreign firm has a quasi-concave production function, 
implying that  .  
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Totally differentiating the FOC in equation (9): 
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The numerator of  can be written as  , where  is the price elasticity of the 
foreign markup and is negative because of the convexity of demand.  It is interesting to note 
that the last term,   is equal to the inverse of the absolute value of the pass-through 
elasticity of exchange rate  .  If pass-through is complete, the foreign markup 
does not respond to prices ( , which occurs with constant elasticity of demand), the 
exchange rate effect on the Turkish lira relative to the price of the foreign firm is zero, and 
.  When pass-through is incomplete,  .  Foreign firm’s price
f
P Q ) )( ( S
f η τ − − 1 1
f η
f η − 1






P Q 0 <
f η
f P does not move 
proportionately and the firm is less able to pass the exchange rate changes to its price, the more 
elastic is the host country’s demand.  In this case   is still positive but larger than the case of 
complete pass-through.  
f
P Q
  The response of output in the host country to a change in the exchange rate depends on 
the relative strength of two effects.  The first one is the income effect and it is positive.  When 
the investor’s currency depreciates, the revenues, and therefore the profit in own currency 
increases.  However, depreciation also increases the cost of producing in the host country, 
which depresses profits.  The net effect depends on the sensitivity of costs to currency 
fluctuations. 
  12  An increase in the tax rate reduces net marginal revenue and hence leads to lower 
output.  A rise in factor costs (in host country or in country of origin) increases marginal cost in 
both countries assuming factors of production are normal. 
From the cost minimization problem, using the envelope theorem, we get the factor 
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F
h f h f
, and hence: 
(11)  , with  ) Q , Q , Z , SZ ( F F
h f h = } , W { Z ρ =  and  .  } , W { Z
h h h ρ =
From the sufficient second order conditions for cost minimization,  ,  ,  , 
, and from the normality assumption of the production factors, ,  .    
0 > w F 0 < ρ F 0 > h w F
0 > h F
ρ F f Q 0 > 0 > h Q F
Replacing (10) into (11), and normalizing with prices we get the reduced form for FDI: 
(12)  .  ) , Y , s , , , w , w ( F F
/ /
h h
/ − − + − + − − − − +
= τ ρ ρ
where the first four terms represent the real costs of labor and capital in host country and 
country of origin respectively, and the third term is the real exchange rate.  Here again the 
direct and the indirect effect of a rise in host country wages make the sign ambiguous.  When 
wages increase, production becomes less labor intensive because the firm substitutes FDI for 
labor.  An increase in labor cost also decreases output and hence reduces the demand for all 
factors of production, including F.     
A rise in the cost of capital in both countries unambiguously reduces demand for F 
because both direct cost effect and the output effect work in the same direction.  A depreciation 
of the currency of the foreign investor (or appreciation of the host country’s currency) has the 
same ambiguous effect as before.  It increases the profit margin and hence output, and the 
demand for factors of production.  The larger is the increase, the smaller is the pass-through of 
the exchange rate change to the product price.  But it also increases the cost of producing in 
terms of the currency of the domestic investor.  The income effect is ambiguous because it 
depends on the income elasticity of the markup. A rise in FDI tax reduces production and 
therefore the demand for F. 
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Most series are quarterly and run from 1986 to the end of 2004.  The annual series have been 
converted to quarterly by linearly smoothing each annual observation to quarterly observations 
such that the last one matches the annual value.  Foreign variables are computed as simple 
averages of the country of origin of foreign investors (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States).  Ideally these series should be a weighted average, 
with the weight being the relative share of each country in the total flows.  Although we could 
find the breakdown of investing countries for FDI, we could not obtain a parallel weight for 
foreign portfolio investment. We, therefore, opted for simple averages. 
The two capital flow components, portfolio investment and FDI to Turkey are from 
Central Bank of Turkey’s Electronic Data System.  Bilateral exchange rates and interest rates 
are from International Financial Statistics.  The interest rate series used for Turkey is the 
three-month time deposits rate.  The foreign interest rate is the lending rate in the investing 
countries.  The only exception is the Italian rate, for which we used the money market rate 
because it is the best proxy for the lending rate (with a correlation coefficient of 0.98 and the 
longest data span).  The economic, financial and political risk series are from the International 
Country Risk Group. 
All the other variables except the risk variables are from the OECD Economic Outlook.  
These are GDP at market price --Turkish and foreign--, cyclically adjusted direct business 
taxes in Turkey and abroad, Turkish and foreign GDP deflator, Turkish and foreign total 
investment deflator (as a proxy for capital price).  The unit labor cost series for Turkey do not 
exist, so we computed them as total salaries and wages over nominal GDP.  Foreign unit labor 
cost is the average of unit labor costs in the countries of origin.   
Our regression equations are:  
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  14normally and identically distributed, serially uncorrelated and with zero mean and constant 
variances.   
  To increase the regression sample size, we impose the restriction on FDI regression that 
t t , w ρ  are expressed as deviations from the corresponding foreign variable.  Since the domestic 
firm that needs to borrow funds is likely to make an arbitrage between the cost of borrowing 
domestically and abroad, we follow a parallel approach to FPI and express  as deviation from 
the domestic rate.  For both real rates and cost of capital, we assume that the domestic 
variable’s effect dominates that of the foreign variable. 
*
t r
  The real interest rate is calculated as the nominal rate adjusted for year-over-year 
percentage change in the GDP deflator.  Following Barrell and Pain (1996), we compute the 









K ∆ − = ρ , where n ∆ is the change 
over n periods.  The term in parentheses is the nominal interest rate adjusted for inflation in 
domestic currency denominated capital prices. We proxy   with the price of investment in 
OECD.  The variable RISK is determined with a simultaneous decision process, which 
involves choosing the type of risk and the optimal lag following the Akaike and Schwartz 
information criteria (AIC and SC )and the minimized sum of squared residuals (SSR) criterion.     
K P
  We first check the order of integration of the variables.  We then proceed testing for 
cointegration between variables integrated of order 1 based on the Maximum Likelihood Test 
by Johansen (1991).   As we observed in Figure 1, FPI and FDI series show strong fluctuations 
during 1998-2001 and 2000-02.  These turbulences following structural breaks most likely 
created instability in the estimates of coefficients whether it affects the long-run relation or not.  
To test the presence of breaks in the functional relations between each investment type and its 
determinants, we allow one or more change in one or more dates, reflecting structural breaks.  
Since these dates are unknown, we estimate them together with the model parameters.  
Two common approaches to estimating breakpoints endogenously are (i) instability 
test-based approach (Andrews, 1992) and (ii) regression-based approach (Bai, 1997a, b and Bai 
and Perron, 1998).  Although the first test is applicable to nonlinear models,  its two  major 
drawbacks are that it can only select one breakpoint endogenously and the asymptotic 
distributions of the F-type test statistics are constructed for non-trending regressors.  It cannot 
be used to test parameter instability in equations (fpi) and (fdi), which contain regressors with 
  15deterministic trends. We, therefore, adopt the regression-based approach developed by Bai, Bai 
and Perron (BBP), which is compatible with such regressors and allows us to find multiple 
breaks. These breaks can be estimated either with the global minimizers algorithm described in 
Perron (1997), or sequential methodology of BBP.  We adopt the latter methodology because it 
is more robust to the wrong choice of the number of breaks and computationally less costly.  
If the number of breaks is known, the sequential methodology estimates the first 
breakpoint   such that  , where  1 ˆ t ) ( min arg ˆ 1 1 1 t S t T t = ) ( 1 t ST  is the sum of squared residuals 
(SSR) resulting from estimating the model over the entire period.  Then the sample is 
partitioned into two sub-periods around   and a one-break model is estimated over each 
subsample, which identifies two additional potential breakpoints associated with a minimized 
SSR for each subsample. Among these points, the second breakpoint   is obtained by 
choosing the breakpoint that allows the largest reduction in the SSR over the whole sample. 
The same procedure is repeated sequentially until the predetermined number of breaks is 
reached.   
1 ˆ t
2 ˆ t
If the number of breakpoints is unknown, the sequential estimation procedure outlined 
above is combined with a sup F type test suggested by Bai and Perron (1998), which consists 
in testing the null hypothesis of m versus m+1 breaks (m=0,1,2,…).  A new breakpoint is then 
estimated if the null is rejected, and the number of breakpoints is obtained at the first value of 
m for which the null is not rejected. An alternative to this test procedure is to combine the 
sequential estimation method with the Bayesian Information Criteria BIC(m) of Yao (1988) 
and the modified Schwarz’ criterion  LWZ(m) of Liu, Wu and Zidek (1997).  The optimal 
number of breakpoints m is then given when the minimum of these information criteria is 
reached. These criteria are appropriate with multiple break models because they introduce a 
penalty factor for additional breakpoints, which necessarily decrease the SSR.
3
In our framework we cannot perform the sequential estimation with a known number of 
breaks since inspection of data does not indicate an obvious number of breaks. The F- test 
procedure for unknown number of breaks is not appropriate either because the underlying 
parameter constancy test requires stationarity of the regressors, a condition that our trended 
                                                 
3 See Perron (1997) for a comparison of the two information criteria. 
  16debt series do not satisfy. We thus adopt the strategy of the sequential estimation with 
unknown number of breaks and information criteria (Perron, 1997).  
Before implementing the BBP methodology, we estimate both investment equations by 
OLS.  We then test for m=1 breaks in each model, which may be represented by a one-time 
change in the coefficient of 1 to all of the 5 variables in equation (13) and 1 to all of the 6 
variables in equation (14).  .  Since we do not have information on identity nor the number of 
the coefficients affected by the break, we apply the methodology of BBP to each combination 
of parameters in each regression equation.
4   For each equation, we chose the specification that 
minimizes the SSR over the whole sample period.  After identifying a first breakpoint, we test 
for a second breakpoint among the unstable parameters determined in the first stage.  We 
follow the same procedure until the mth (le nb de rupture est m) break when the BIC(m) and 
LWZ(m) criteria cannot be minimized further.
5 Bai (1997b) shows that when all m breakpoints 
are estimated, a reestimation (or refinement) of the first m-1 break dates over the sample 
periods, bounded by successive estimated dates, improves the estimation results.  In the case of 
two breakpoints, if   is located to the right of   ( > 1 ˆ t , then  1 ˆ t should be reestimated over 
the period [1,  ].   
2 ˆ t 1 ˆ t 2 ˆ t )  
2 ˆ t
We also use the stationarity of the error term as an additional criterion for the number 
of breaks, which suggests that the model is well specified. To conduct the stationarity test, we 
perform a residual-based unit root test and use MacKinnon’s (1991) all-sample estimated 
critical values. The stationarity of the residuals suggests that the number and location of the 
estimated breakpoints correspond to those of the « true » model.  Finally, to evaluate the 
degree of estimation accuracy of each estimated breakpoint we construct a confidence interval 
at the 5% level following the methodology in Bai, 1997 (see Appendix B for technical details).  
 
                                                 















5 Bai (1997b) shows that when all m breakpoints are estimated, a reestimation (or refinement) of the first 
m-1 break dates over the sample periods, bounded by successive estimated dates, improves the estimation 
results.  In the case of two breakpoints, if   is located to the right of   ( > ), then   should be 
reestimated over the period [1,  ].   
2 ˆ t 1 ˆ t 2 ˆ t 1 ˆ t 1 ˆ t
2 ˆ t
 
  17V. Estimation Results 
For the standard asymptotic theory to be valid, the variables used in the regression must be 
stationary or if they are integrated of order 1 or I(1), they should be cointegrated.  The ADF 
test results (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) indicate that the independent variables are all I(1) while 
the dependent variables are stationary.  In this case, if we find one or more cointegration 
relations between the I(1) variables, the error term of the regression will be stationary.   
  To test the cointegration between the nonstationary variables with the Johansen 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) test procedure, we used the AIC to determine optimally the test 
specification and the number of lags. The tests suggest a model with intercept, no trend and 
four lags for FPI and a model with intercept, trend and two lags for FDI.  The Johansen test 
results show that there is one cointegrating relation for both portfolio investment and FDI over 
the full-sample period (Table 2, top and bottom panels, respectively).    
Next, we turn to the estimation results for both flows (Tables 3 and 4).  The first 
column presents the finding when the breaks are not accounted for, the second and third 
columns shows the results when one and two breaks are allowed for, respectively.  Endogenous 
variables without subscript correspond to the regression equation with no break (column 1), 
and the ones with subscripts correspond to one or two breaks (columns 2 and 3).  The last 
column are the regression results when the nonsignificatif variables have been omitted from the 
previous column.  The t-statistics are derived from Newy-West heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent covariances. 
 
No Breaks 
The first striking aspect of the results is that if we do not account for breaks due to crises, the 
explanatory power of the regressions is very low.  The variations in the independent variables 
account for about 10 and 20 percent of the variations in FPI and FDI, respectively.  The first 
column in Figure 3 explains this lackluster result.  In both regressions, the fitted value (in red) 
tracks the actual value reasonably well, except at the end of the sample when the economy 
deals with the ramifications of the Russian crisis and the subsequent domestic banking crisis.  
The fit of FPI is particularly affected since the flows are hit by both crises while most 
fluctuations are missed in FDI during the domestic crisis. 
  18The signs and the magnitudes of the coefficients are in general in line with the 
predictions of the theory.  An increase in the real interest differential and financial risk reduce 
the inflows of portfolio flows.  The negative sign of interest differential suggests that foreign 
and domestic borrowings are complements rather than substitutes. Tax rates are not a 
significant factor in determining FPI flows. We conducted the regressions with all three risk 
types and found that the financial risk is the risk category that matters most for foreign lenders 
and the relation is negative, as expected.  Economic risk is insignificant in all model 
specifications and political risk is not robust to model specification.  The labor cost affects FPI 
flows positively.  This may suggest that the substitution effect dominates and that more 
expensive labor makes firms to substitute foreign capital for domestic labor. On the other hand, 
and more likely, this may simply be a spurious correlation caused by simultaneous increases in 
the labor cost in Turkey and variations in FPI.   
An increase in the real cost of capital differential and taxes reduces FDI.  Here also, a 
higher cost of labor affects the flows positively, for possibly the same reasons as in FPI.  The 
coefficient of the real exchange rate is positive and significant, and consistent with the findings 
in the literature.  It suggests that a depreciation of the Turkish lira increases the FDI because it 
reduces the cost of production in terms of foreign investor’s currency by more than the 
decrease in the profit margins caused by valuation effect.   
We tested for all three categories of country risk and found that the economic risk is the 
most relevant one for foreign direct investment.  This is consistent with the view that the FDI is 
mainly affected by economic fundamentals and is less volatile.  The positive sign indicates that 
as the risk increases, most investors revert to FDI and presumably pull out from portfolio 
investment.  This is in line with the view that investors increase their shares in companies and, 
therefore, their control during uncertain times when economic risks rise.
6   
 
One Break 
Using the methodology described above, we identify a first breakpoint for both investment 
equations at the start of the twin crises.  The BIC and LWZ criteria suggest a break in 2000.3 
for FPI and 2000.2 for FDI (see the minimum SSR, Figure 3, column 2).  The BBP 
                                                 
6 There is a fair amount of evidence showing that foreign acquisitions increase during currency crises for a 
variety of reasons (see for example Froot and Stein, 1991, Blonigen, 1997, Aguiar and Gopinath, 2003, 
Desai, Foley and Forbes, 2004). 
  19methodology determines that for FPI, the constant, the ulc and the risk variables are affected by 
the crisis and thus have unstable parameters (Table 3, second column).  For FDI, the number of 
coefficients affected is larger and consists of the constant, labor and cost of capital 
differentials, the tax differential and the economic risk perceived by investors (Table 4, second 
column). 
  Accounting for the crisis considerably increases the explanatory power of the 
regressions, to more than 40 percent for FPI and a remarkable 80 percent for FDI.  The 
breakpoint is estimated with high precision since the confidence interval is tight around the 
estimated date.  The 95 percent interval is [2000:1, 2000:3] for FDI and [2000:2, 2000:4] for 
FPI.  The fitted model now replicates well the effect of the banking crisis on both flows.   
  Before the break, the labor cost-FPI relation (the coefficient of  ) is positive as it w
in the first column, but it becomes negative after that: an increase in the ulc decreases foreig
portfolio investment proportionally.  The real interest differential and taxes still affect FPI as 
before, with no instability in the relation.  A 1 percent rise in the interest spread reduces 
portfolio inflows by 0.02 percent, while a rise in taxes decreases the flows almost 
proportionately.  A larger financial risk tended to depress FPI before the break.  After the 
crisis, however, the relation becomes positive.  This counterintuitive result can be attributed to 
the shortness of the second subsample.  Inspection of the data reveals that following the 
financial crisis, the financial risk index was rising, reflecting markets nervousness, while FPI 
replaced partially a depressed FDI (Figure 2). 
1 ulc as 
n 
  Turning to FDI, our findings indicate that the twin crises introduced instability in all 
coefficients, except in that of the real exchange rate.  The positive relation between the 
exchange rate and the FDI inflows remains unchanged and suggests about 0.01 percent decline 
in inflows following 1 percent depreciation of the Turkish lira.  The coefficients of three other 
variables, ulc, taxes, and economic risk, also preserve their sign before and after the crisis, but 
their magnitude becomes larger.  In fact, while taxes were not a major factor determining FDI 
before the breakpoint, they become significant after that: a 1 percent increase in the relative tax 
rate depresses FDI more than proportionally.  After 2000, FDI also responds more strongly to 
variations in the country risk factor.  It is interesting to note that the sign of the risk coefficient 
remains positive before and after the crisis, but the magnitude increases substantially, lending 
further support to the view that foreign acquisitions increase during crises.  Finally, omitting 




The fitted model of FPI suggests that although the model captures the dip in inflows during the 
banking crises, it is still missing the previous, larger plunge that took place during the Russian 
crisis (Figure 3).  In principle, a search for the second break is conducted to the left and to the 
right of the initial breakpoint of 2000.2.  However, the shortness of the sample after 2000 
makes estimates unreliable.  Moreover, the SSR is not minimized compared with the second 
breakpoint identified to the left of the first breakpoint and the criteria BIC and LWZ 
corresponding to the model with 2 breaks are minimized compared to the model 1 break.  For 
these reasons, we concentrate on the breakpoint to the left of 2000.3.   
  The break tests identify 1998.2 as the second breakpoint, which corresponds to the 
Russian crisis.  Accounting for both dates, the model captures the effect of both crises on FPI 
and the two slumps that occurred during these dates (Figure 3 third column).  The 95 percent 
confidence interval around the estimated date is again tight, [1998:1, 1998:3], reflecting the 
rliability of the estimated date (Table 3, third column).  The explanatory power of the 
regression increases by third to about 60 percent.  Interestingly enough, the BIC and LWZ 
criteria are not minimized when we estimate a second break for FDI.  As FDI is not affected by 
other crises, this is not surprising, since it is hard to improve the fit and the explanatory power 
of the regression equation with one break.  We, therefore, keep the model with a single break. 
  Starting with the stable coefficients in FPI, introducing a second break preserves the 
sign but not the significance of real rate spread and tax differential (Table 3, column 3).  Low 
significance of the spread is likely due to collinearity with the constants.  Dropping the 
insignificant two constants helps improve the significance of the spread (last column).  The 
positive relation between ulc and FPI changes to negative in the last subperiod, where a rise in 
labor cost reduces the inflows.  There is weak evidence that financial risk still affects 
negatively the portfolio flows in the first two periods.  The effect of the risk factor becomes 
significant and negative between the two crises, 1998-2000, when the constants are removed. It 
maintains its significance and sign of the one-break regressions after 2000.  We end our break 
analysis for FPI at two breakpoints since we could not find a third break for FPI. 
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VI.  Conclusion 
There is almost a universal agreement on the importance of foreign capital in the economic 
development of an emerging or developing economy.  These economies often go through 
structural reforms and are constantly challenged by international crises, which affect capital 
flows to these countries.  Any crisis or major reform is likely to create structural breaks, which 
can induce instability in the estimated parameters of the capital flow models if the breaks are 
not controlled for.  We show that this is indeed the case and that several parameters are 
affected by breaks.  Thus, analyses based on the assumption of parameter constancy can be 
misleading because they would be based on biased results. 
  We develop a theoretical model describing portfolio and FDI flows, which we apply to 
Turkey and use an endogenous break analysis to determine the break dates and accounting for 
various country risk factors . We identify the Russian crisis of 1998 and the domestic banking 
crises of 2000 as endogenous breakpoints.  We find that FPI was hit by contagion fears in 
1998, while both flows were adversely affected by the domestic banking crisis.  Our results 
show changes in the sign and/or coefficient of a number of determinants in both types of 
investment.  Crises lead to structural breaks and affect the relation between FDI and cost of 
capital and labor, taxes and the economic risk profile of the country.  Structural breaks 
introduce instability in the response of portfolio flows to labor cost and financial risk.  Some 
coefficients remain stable.  An increase in taxes depresses both flows, a rise in the spread 
decreases portfolio flows, while a depreciation of the currency encourages FDI.  The portfolio 
investment decreases as the financial risk increases, while FDI is used as an outlet for foreign 
investors when the economic risk increases.  Political risk does not seem to be a factor 
influencing capital inflows. 
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Table 1: Net Inward Foreign Direct Investment 2000-02 † 
 (billions of dollars)  




160.6 171.7 143.0 
     
Czech 
Republic 
5 4.9  8.1 
Hungary  1.6 2.4 1.0 
Poland  9.3 5.7 4.1 
     
Argentina  11.7 3.2  0.7 
Brazil  32.8 22.6 16.6 
Chile  3.6 4.5 1.7 
     
Turkey  1.0 3.3 1.0 
 
    †Source: World Bank Publications and World Development 
       Indicators.
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Table 2: Johansen Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Test Results† 
 
FPI (foreign portfolio investment) Equation 
Eigenv Trace  
Statistics 




















































†The p-values are provided by MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999) . A * indicates that the hypothesis is 
rejected at the 5% level. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results: Foreign Portfolio Investment And Endogenous Breaks † 
 
Independent 
Variables and breakdates 
Model with 
No break 













c  -0.00 
(0.3) 
    
















    
















































2 R   0.095 0.441  0.633  0.64 
SSR  0.007 0.002  0.001  0.001 
BIC   -9.965  -10.191   
LWZ   -9.568 -9.61   
DW  1.729 2.090  1.945  1.854 
ADF     -7.9   
 
†  Independent variables are defined as ulc=real unit labor cost, r-r*= real interest differential, tax-
tax*=differential of tax rate, riskfin=financial risk MA(4), subscripts correspond to the values of variables before 
and after the breakpoint(s). Figures in brackets below estimated breakdates are 5% confidence intervals. Figures 
in parentheses are absolute values of t-statistics based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent covariances.  BIC and LWZ are Yao’s (1988) and Liu, Wu and Zidek’s (1997) information criteria 
depending on the number of breaks. ADF is the augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistics. MacKinnon’s (1991) size 
dependent asymptotic critical values for residual based unit root tests are -4.27 for the full sample (T=65) and -
4.31 for the sub-sample (T=54). 
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Table 4. Estimation Results: Foreign Direct Investment  And Endogenous Breaks † 
 
Independent 
Variables and Breakdates 
Model with No 
break 
 Model with  
1 Break 
*




c   0.01 
(2.7) 
  








*) ulc ulc ( − 0.03 
(3.4) 
  








3 *) ( ulc ulc −     
*) ( ρ ρ −   -0.01 
(2.1) 
  














*) tax tax ( −   -0.01 
(0.3) 
  
1 *) ( tax tax −    -0.01 
(0.3) 
 














2 R   0.23 0.81  0.81 
SSR 0.11E-3  2.46E-5  2.46E-5 
BIC   -14.09   
LWZ   -13.55   
DW 2.20  2.05  2.68 
ADF   -11.72   
 
† See footnote to Table 3.  ulc-ulc*=real unit labor cost differential,  * ρ ρ − capital cost differential, s=real 
exchange rate, tax-tax*=differential of tax rate, rskeco=economic risk MA(7).  Both  * ρ ρ − and s are scaled up 
by 1000.   
 
  26References 
 
 
Agenor, P.-R., C.J. McDermott, M. Ucer (1997) “Fiscal imbalances, capital flows and the 
real exchange rate: the case of Turkey”, European Economic Review, 41 (3-5), 819-25. 
Aguiar, M. and G. Gopinath (2003) “Fire-sale FDI”, University of Chicago, working 
paper. 
Andrews, D. (1993).  Tests for parameter instability and structural change with unknown 
change point.  Econometrica, 61 (4), 821-56   
Akcay, O.C., C.E. Alper, M. Karasulu (1997) “Currency substitution and exchange rate 
instability: the Turkish case”, European Economic Review, 41 (3-5), 827-35.  
Alfaro, L., S. Kalemli-Ozcan and V. Volosovych (2003) “Why doesn’t capital flow from 
rich to poor countries? an empirical investigation”, mimeo, Harvard University. 
______________________ (2004) “Capital flows in a globalized world: the role of 
policies and institutions”, mimeo. 
Asikogu, Y. and M. Uctum (1992) “A critical evaluation of exchange rate policy in 
Turkey”, World Development, 20, 10, 1501-14. 
Balasubramanyam, V. (1996), ”Foreign direct investment in Turkey”, in: Togan S. and V.  
Balasubramyam (eds), The Economy of Turkey since liberalization, New-York: St Martin’s 
Press; London: Macmillan Press, 112-30.   
Bai J. (1997a),  “Estimating multiple breaks one at a time”,  Econometric Theory, 13, 
315-52. 
Bai J. (1997b), “Estimation of a change point in multiple regression models”,  Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 79 (4), 551-63. 
Bai J. and Perron P. (1998),  “Estimating and testing linear models with multiple 
structural changes”, Econometrica,  66 (1), 47-78. 
Balkir, C. (1993), “Turkey and the European Community: foreign trade and direct foreign 
investment in the 1980s”, in: Balkir C. and A.Williams (Eds), Turkey and Europe, London: 
Pinter. 
Barrell, R. and N. Pain (1996), “An econometric analysis of US foreign direct 
investment”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78, 2, 200-207. 
Blonigen, B. (1997), “Firm-specific assets and the link between exchange rates and 
foreign direct investment”, The American Economic Review, 87, 3, 447-465. 
Bosworth, B. and S.M. Collins (1999) “Capital flows to developing economies: 
implications for savings and investment”, Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 143-80. 
Chuhan, P., S. Claessens, N. Mamingi (1998) “Equity and bond flows to Latin America 
and Asia: the role of global and country factors”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol.55, 
439-63. 
Calvo, G.(1998) “Capital flows and capital-market crises: the simple economics of 
sudden stops”, University of Maryland, College Park. 
Carlson, M and L. Hernandez (2002) “Determinants and repercussions of the 
composition of capital flows”, Board of Governors of the FRS, International Finance Discussion 
Papers #717. 
Claasens, S., M. Dooley, and A. Warner (1995), “Portfolio capital flows: hot or cold,” 
The World Bank Economic Review, Vol.9 (1). 
  27Cushman, D. (1985), “Real exchange rate risk, expectations and the level of direct 
investment”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67, 2, 297-308. 
Desai, M., C.F. Foley, K. Forbes (2004). “Financial constraints and growth: multinational 
and local firm responses to currency crises”, NBER WP #10545.  
Dickey, D.A. and W.A. Fuller (1979). "Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive 
Time Series with a Unit Root," Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 427-431. 
Eichengreen, B. and R. Hausmann (1999), “Exchange rates and financial fragility,” in 
New Challenges for MonetaryPolicy, Kansas City, Missouri: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City, pp.329-368. 
Froot, K. and J.C. Stein (1991), “Exchange rates and foreign direct investment: an 
imperfect capital markets approach”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 4, 1191-1217. 
Fry, M. (1993), “Foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia: differential impacts”, 
ISEAS Current Economic affairs Series, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ASEAN 
Economic research Unit, pages viii, 69.  
Guncavdi, Ö., M. Bleaney and A. McKay (1998), “Financial liberalisation and private 
investment: evidence from Turkey”, Journal of Development Economics, 57(2), 443-55. 
International Monetary Fund (1995) International Capital Markets: Developments, 
prospects and policy issues, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Johansen, S. (1991). "Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in 
Gaussian Vector Autoregressive Models", Econometrica, 59, 1551-1580. 
Klein, M. and E. Rosengren (1994), “The real exchange rate and foreign direct 
investment in the United States: relative wealth vs. relative wage effects”, Journal of 
International Economics, 36, 3-4, 373-89. 
Lehmann, A. (1999), “Country risks and the Investment activity if US multinationals in 
developing countries”, IMF WP/99/133. 
Liu, J., Wu, S. and Zidek, V. (1997).  On segmented multivariate regressions.  Statistica 
Sinica, 7, 497-527. 
Lim, E.-G. (2001) “Determinants of, and the relation between, foreign direct investment 
and growth”, IMF WP #01/175. 
MacKinnon, J. G. (1991). "Critical Values for Cointegration Tests," Chapter 13 in R. F. 
Engle and C. W. J. Granger (eds.), Long-run Economic Relationships: Readings in 
Cointegration, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
MacKinnon, J. G., A.A. Haug, and L. Michelis (1999), "Numerical distribution 
functions of likelihood ratio tests for cointegration", Journal of Applied Econometrics, 
14, 563-577. 
Milesi Ferretti, G.M. and A. Razin (1998), “Current account reversals and 
currency crises: an empirical treatment”, NBER WP6620. 
Perron P. (1997).  L’estimation de modèles avec changements structurels 
multiples.  L’Actualité Economique, 73 (1-2-3), 457-505.  
Reinhart, C. and E. Talvi (1998) “Capital flows and saving in Latin America and 
Asia: a reinterpretation”, Journal of Development Economics 57(1), 45-66. 
Rodrik, D. (1990) “Premature Liberalization, Incomplete Stabilization: The Ozal 
Decade in Turkey”, NBER WP 3300. 
Sarno, L. and M.Taylor (1997) “Capital Flows to Developing Countries: Long- and 
Short-Term Determinants”, World Bank Economic Review  11 (3), 451-70.  
  28Uctum, M. (1992) “The effects of liberalization on traded and nontraded goods sectors: 
the case of Turkey” in T. Nas and M. Odekon (eds.) Economics and Politics of Turkish 
Liberalization, Lehigh University Press, Associated University Press. 
Ulengin, B. N. Yenturk (2001) “Impact of capital inflows on aggregate spending 
categories: the case of Turkey”, Applied Economics, 33(10), 1321-28. 
Yao, Y.C. (1988).  Estimating the number of change-points via Schwarz’ criterion. 
Statistics and Probability Letters, 6, 181-9. 
Yenturk, N. (1999) “Short-term capital inflows and their impact on macroeconomic 
structure: Turkey in the 1990s”, Developing Economies, 37(1), 89-113. 
Wei, S.-J, and Y. Wu (2001), “Negative alchemy? Corruption, composition of capital 
flows and currency crises” 
Wilkins, M. (1999), “Two literatures, two storylines: is a general paradigm of foreign 
portfolio and foreign direct investment feasible?”, Transnational Corporations, 8(1), April, 53-
116.   
 





























































  30  31
 
 























































































































































































































Figure 3: Actual and Fitted Regression Results With Endogenous Breaks







Investment flows with unknown multiple breaks (Bai (1997), Bai and Perron (1998)) 
 
Equations (13) and (14)  with   ( =0,1,2,…) unknown breakpoints can be written as:   m m
(B1)     t t I t t
m
j
j t v x z y
j + + = ∈
+




where   is the dependent variable B/GDP or F/GDP,     and   are vectors of 
independent variables of which the parameters may or may not be subject to shift, respectively, 
 is the sub-period between break dates   and  , and   an indicator function such that 
= 1 for   and 0 elsewhere (we set 
t y t z ) 1 (qx t x ) 1 (px
j I 1 − j t j t
j I t∈ 1
j I t∈ 1 j j t t t ≤ < −1 1 0 = t  and  T tm = +1 ). The parameter vectors 
j α  and β  and the disturbance term   are specific to the investment flow considered.  t v j α  
(j=1,…, m+1) are estimated over the sub-period  , while  j I β  is defined over the full sample. 
The constant term is included either in  j α  or in β . When m=0, (B1) reduces to model (13) or 
(14) 
The method of sequential least squares estimation consists in first, estimating (B1) for 
m=1, over the entire period and identifying the first breakpoint  , where 
 is the sum of squared residuals from the one-break model with the candidate break date 
. Bai and Perron (1998) show that   is consistent for the true single breakpoint. The sample 
is then split into two and a one-break model is estimated over each sub-sample [1,  ] and 
[ ,T], yielding two potential break dates,  1 ˆ
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model (B1) for m=2 breakpoints   and
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with ea na reak, is  p m q ) m ( + + +1  (Perron 1998). Following Bai (1997b), a 
95% confidence interval for the estim e tˆ  in the case of trending regressors can 
be computed as [ 1 ] ˆ / [ ˆ , 1 ] ˆ / [ ˆ + + − − L c t L c t  ], where  ] ˆ / [  is the integer part of  ˆ / , c 
the 97.5th quint ymmetric case cdf formula as c=11 nd 
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